Michael Walzer stands out as one of the most important just war theorists of the past thirty years, if not the most important. His book *Just and Unjust Wars* updates just war theory so as to fit conditions of cold war thinking, techniques of modern warfare, and nuclear deterrence, so much different from times of the theory’s origins. Drawing upon ancient sources such as Augustine, Thomas, and Grotius, Walzer argues that just war theory despite its religious roots is a secular theory, putting limits to both religious claims for total pacifism and to religious claims in favor of a crusader approach. A war may be waged if there are no other means to prevent gross injustice to occur or to continue – most importantly the injustice of massive killing and enslaving. War, of course, does the same: people get killed, injured, and traumatized, and cultural, economic, and natural goods are threatened. There is no such thing as a clean war. Soldiers in wartime conditions are no ‘grown-up Boy Scouts, doing good deeds’ (*AAW*, 174). War implies a license to kill and an awareness that one’s own soldiers may get killed.

Walzer not only rejects pacifism, but also the ‘realism’ of those who claim that, since war is ugly and nasty by definition, it is virtually impossible to suggest rules of justice which apply to the means of warfare. Against this position of *inter armes silent leges* (described by others as ‘in love and in war everything is permitted’), Walzer argues that even wartime actions should stand under the critique of justice. Such wartime justice differs from justice in peacetime: ‘All of us who argue about the rights and wrongs of war agree that justice in the strong sense, the sense that it has in domestic society and everyday life, is lost as soon as the fighting begins’ (*AAW*, x).

Walzer is criticized from different political angles. *Just and Unjust Wars* was written in the aftermath of the Vietnam War of which Walzer is deeply critical. Jurjen Wiersma’s description of American foreign policy in terms of ‘structural aggression and structural violence’ (*WDD*, 262) may not be fully representative of Walzer’s view, but Walzer, too,
is critical about America’s military ambitions and has been criticized for being a bad patriot. Others have contended that Walzer provides world rulers a theoretical justification for unjust wars, and point to his support for the March 2002 invasion of Afghanistan as a case example. Walzer admits that ‘the rulers of this world embraced the theory, and did not fight a single war without describing it . . . as a war for peace and justice’ (AAW, 4). But perhaps the most serious criticism has come from mainstream just war tradition. In its Thomistic version, just war theory uses the concept of the Principle of Double Effect, which rejects the direct and intentional killing of noncombatants. As we will see below, Walzer condones large scale intentional killing of civilians (‘terror bombing’) under circumstances of extreme emergency.

To all this criticism, Walzer replies that just war theory is ‘made for criticism’ (AAW, xii), with a rejection of every kind of complacency about war firmly at its core. Even if a war is waged on the basis of sound arguments, we always have to ask whether really everything was done to prevent or restrain the evil of war. Still, Walzer’s almost optimistic contention that ‘[d]isagreements don’t invalidate a theory; the theory, if it is a good one, makes the disagreements more coherent and comprehensible’ (AAW, xii) creates a sense of elusiveness. Since his account of just war theory may yield different outcomes, how reliable and unambiguous is its guiding function?

Since the first edition of *Just and Unjust Wars*, the demands on just war theory have changed. Walzer’s *Arguing about War*, a collection of essays which were published over the years, displays his capacity to incorporate new developments and discussions. The end of the cold war generated dreams of democracy spreading all over the world. Terrorist actions with unprecedented numbers of casualties led to extreme safety measures and necessitated a revision of combat strategies; ethnic cleansing and genocide aroused an increasing awareness that the world’s moral responsibility does not stop at the borders of sovereign states, but may well imply humanitarian intervention. Slowly but steadily Walzer focuses away from the rights and territorial integrity of nation states towards human rights in general (cf. *MCW*). Hence, he has become increasingly open to the option of humanitarian intervention:

I have slowly become more willing to call for military intervention. I haven’t dropped the presumption against intervention that I defended in (*Just and Unjust Wars*), but I have found it easier and easier to override the presumption. (AAW, xiii)

Even so, ‘[d]espite all that I have said so far, I don’t mean to abandon the principle of nonintervention – only to honor its exceptions’ (AAW, 81).

In line with this openness to humanitarian intervention, Walzer has...
become increasingly open to the option of some kind of a ‘global state’. When a decision to intervene is made by a body of states, and the responsibility for right conduct in and after the conflict is a shared concern, a war is likely to be more just and more successful. Walzer appeals to dreams of a world in which just war issues no longer are actual and in which ‘calling the police’ would be the right response to violence (AAW, xiv). However, in recent years, he seems increasingly skeptical towards the UN as an effective agent of global law and order (AAW, 145; Starkey 281).

As for terrorism, this relatively ‘new’ threat to world peace, Walzer is hesitant to apply just war criteria here. Covert action plays a pivotal role. The distinction between rulers (who, in their quality of potential peacemakers, enjoy immunity against intentional killing) and military leaders (who may be attacked and killed in wartime) is blurred in the case of terrorism. In the case of a ‘war on terrorism,’ it is also hard to tell when the war is over. The conventional signs of a formal surrender will probably not be reached. Instead, the signs of ‘winning’ will be a decline in attacks and in the scope of attacks, the collapse of morale among terrorists, the appearance of informers, defectors, and opportunists from their ranks, the silence of those who once defended terrorism, and a growing sense of safety among the public (AAW, 141). Walzer’s caution here is indicative of a broader embarrassment about the applicability of just war theory to the ‘war on terrorism.’

All this may serve as an introduction to exploring a field which Walzer he has not dealt with so much: post war justice. For all Walzer’s merits for just war theory, he has not provided a systematic account of *jus post bellum*. Given the increasing sense of responsibility that the world community has not only for respecting territorial integrity and sovereignty, but also for human rights, this absence of a solid conception of post war justice becomes increasingly problematic. Walzer himself admits in 2003 that ‘*(jus post bellum* (is) the least developed part of just war theory, but obviously important these days’ (AAW, 163). He admits that what he earlier wrote about *jus post bellum* ‘doesn’t even begin to address many of the problems that have arisen (recently)’ (*Arguing about War*, xiii). In the absence of a systematic account, we will put some pieces of Walzer’s just-peace-puzzle together, aided by a more systematic account by Brian Orend, a follower of Walzer’s.

**Just peacemaking**

A just peace is more than the mere cessation of hostilities. It also presupposes a certain quality of the processes leading to this peace, it
addresses issues of guilt and compensation, it refers to the quality of new domestic and international relationships, it addresses issues of justice and human rights in the states involved, and it implies measures to prevent new conflicts. Before discussing these criteria, we need to distinguish between just peacemaking and jus post bellum. Just peacemaking may in itself mean different things. Sometimes, if not featuring as an outright alternative to just war theory, just peacemaking stands as a bridging concept between just war theory and pacifism. In the latter case, it serves as an elaboration of the just war criterion of last resort, i.e., the requirement that parties do all they can to ensure a peaceful outcome of an imminent conflict. Glen Stassen argues that just war theory tends to oversee the need to make peace before a conflict escalates. Arguing whether war is right is not enough to prevent it (Stassen 135). He suggests a number of strategies, including unilateral and in part humble steps intended to bring parties together. The party which ensures peace by taking such extraordinary steps is normally credited for its moral superiority. Just peacemaking is considered just in the broad sense of morally praiseworthy, and ‘justice’ refers to the high standards of justice which normally feature in peacetime.

Quite differently, ‘just peacemaking’ may also refer to strategies which bring a war, once begun, to an end. The moral status of this kind of peacemaking is more dubious than it is in the context before the outbreak of a war: the end of a war is normally the result of the military superiority of one party over the other, which includes killing and other acts of violence. So what exactly can be ‘just’ here: is it the fact that peace is brought about, and that the war has led to the desired result? Or does ‘just’ refer to the means used to reach peace? In the latter case, is the ‘justness’ of the means defined in terms of the high standards of justice in peacetime, such as unilateral acts aiming at reconciliation rather than victory? Or is it defined in terms of the extraordinary justice of the jus in bello? For Walzer, the term, ‘just peace’ refers primarily to a post war situation. The two kinds of justice are only loosely connected. Hence, a peace may be just even when the war wasn’t.

**Immoral Acts for a Just Peace?**

If it is true that history is written by the winners, the question not only whether the war was just, but also whether its peacemaking was just, will tend to be answered in terms of the moral superiority of the winner, even if both the war was fought and the peace was attained by questionable means. This paradoxical relation between jus in bello and a just peace goes back to the just war criterion of reasonable chance of success. A
just war is a war worth fighting for, and that can hardly mean a war which one is about to lose beforehand. The justness of a war in part depends on the prospect that it can be won. A decision to go to war is built upon guesses, probabilities, and prospects, the truth and accuracy of which can only be established in hindsight. A country may have been right in starting a war, given the information it had at a certain point in time, not knowing the real military strength of its adversary, or not anticipating extreme weather conditions, for example. The intention to win is a *sine qua non*. A lost war is not by definition an unjust war, but once begun, no opportunity should be ignored to bring about the victory.

But which opportunity? The case of ‘extreme emergency’ as elaborated by Walzer may serve to illustrate the problem. What if, in the course of a war that was justly started, the odds change and a victory can only be achieved by intentionally killing noncombatants? Walzer sees the massive bombing of German cities in the early war years 1941-1942 as justifiable. This justification is not based on a right to reprisals: “‘Reprisals,’” wrote a pacifist critic of the rules of war, “mean doing what you think wrong on the plea that someone else did it first” (*JUW*, 207). The allied’s bombing cannot be justified on the basis of the words, ‘*tu quoque*.’ Rather, the indiscriminate bombing was necessary for prospective reasons. Given the extreme inhumanity of Nazism – its victory could well mean the end of human civilization – in combination with its grand military success, the war *had* to be won. Indiscriminate bombing of cities, with its effect on the morale of the German people, was one of the last options to turn the tide. (Of course, one may wonder whether any war which one can afford not to win, can be called just.)

Thus, in an ‘extreme emergency,’ utilitarian considerations override more deontological elements. The morally superior party has to compromise its own moral integrity for the sake of a higher good: a just peace. *Prima facie* immoral acts of the ‘right’ party are justified on the basis of gross immorality of the ‘evil’ party. A just peace justifies an unjust war.

**Surrender: What Surrender?**

In *Just and Unjust Wars*, Walzer extensively discusses the allied forces’ insistence on the unconditional surrender of Nazi-Germany. He defends this demand by referring to Nazism’s total and unprecedented threat to humanity. Under other circumstances, however, unconditional surrender is more problematic. Given the more ‘normal’ character of the German state in World War I, Walzer argues that the demand for unconditional surrender was out of proportion there. ‘Versailles’ presented and generated new injustice instead of ending it, with all its consequences for the
German political landscape in the ‘twenties and ‘thirties. The demand of unconditional surrender by the Japanese after World War II was similarly unjust (JUW, 112), since the Japanese no longer posed a real threat to world peace: ‘Japan’s rulers were engaged in a more ordinary sort of military expansion, and all that was morally required was that they be defeated, not that they be conquered and totally overthrown’ (JUW, 268-9). US military leaders justified the use of the atomic bomb in utilitarian terms: the killing of hundreds of thousands of civilians was preferable to ‘a vast, indefinite butchery’ which could go on for another year and which could have cost millions of casualties, both soldiers and civilians. Walzer points to the other alternative to the use of nuclear weapons: negotiating a peace treaty. Unconditional surrender should not have been demanded. It was an unjust peace.

Retribution?

The demand of unconditional surrender may sometimes be justified in order to exclude new aggression, but it may also serve as a ‘punitive policy.’ Walzer is skeptical about this option (JUW, 115). He agrees with Kecskemeti’s argument that one should be cautious about succumbing to ‘the pedagogic fallacy,’ that is, to try to build a peaceful post-war world ‘on the undying memory of a just chastisement’ (Quoted JUW, 115). Again, Nazi-Germany is the exception here. Walzer agrees with Kecskemeti that ‘just chastisement’ normally only works in domestic law, but the special character of Nazism required the ‘chastisement’ of Nazi leaders (JUW, 116).

Who should be chastised? Crusaders make no distinction between rulers, soldiers, and citizens. Their chastisement is indiscriminate. A just peace does demand such a distinction, and the indiscriminate punishment of a whole nation can only yield a sense of injustice. (Of course, a nation may need peace education, but here, the goal is not retribution but prevention.)

Walzer also points to the possibility that a victim state might deserve reparations from the aggressor state (JUW, 297). Brian Orend elaborates his own account of accountability in discussion with Walzer. He agrees with Walzer: ‘To put (it) bluntly, Aggressor has cost Victim a considerable amount, and so at least some restitution is due’ (MOW, 166). But where Walzer argues that compensation should be paid from the taxation system of the defeated aggressor, Orend rejects such indiscriminacy. ‘The critical questions seem to be: how much and from whom in Aggressor is the compensation to be paid out?’ Orend advocates a twofold application of the principle of proportionality with regard to
reparations: they should be proportional both to the inflicted injustice and to Aggressor’s resources so as to not bankrupt him. The most ‘unproblematic’ assets are the personal wealth of the political and military elites in Aggressor who were most responsible for the crime of aggression. ‘Respect for discrimination entails taking a reasonable amount of compensation only from those sources: (1) which can afford it; and (2) which were materially linked to the aggression in a morally culpable way’. Otherwise, the resources for reconstruction ‘simply’ (!) have to be found elsewhere (MOW, 167). This may well mean that a victim state does not get enough compensation, and Orend knows only one exception: if Victim can no longer afford to be a minimally just state. ‘If both Victim and Aggressor, after war, retain resources clearly above the minimal level, then the financial restitution (...) must be limited to the assets of the guilty’ (MOW, 167). Nor does he advocate sanctions on a whole country, since they end up punishing those who do not deserve such treatment (MOW, 168).

Following this line would have led to a different policy as to the German citizens’ responsibility, through their taxation system, for reparation to neighboring states and to Holocaust survivors. On the other hand, his argument has some intuitive appeal when it is applied to the aftermath of 9/11: since many Afghans are hardly less the nourishing basis of Bin Laden’s terror than many Germans were for the Holocaust, any logic of common guilt for Islamist violence would have led to heavy claims on the Afghan people. In my view, however, Walzer’s approach is the most convincing one. There certainly are decisive differences between Nazi-Germani and Talibani-Afghanistan which would justify helping the Afghans rather than squeezing them dry. Under more ‘normal’ (i.e., more structured and more affluent) condition, Walzer’s contention is helpful that the distribution of costs is not the distribution of guilt (JUW 297). Walzer’s account allows for some awareness, if not of common guilt, at least of common responsibility of the citizens of an aggressor state. Has Orend fallen for an all too individualistic account of guilt and responsibility?

**Between a Minimum Option and a Crusader Peace**

Unconditional surrender may be necessary for securing peace, and it may serve punitive purposes. But it may also yield an unjust peace. Sometimes the demand of unconditional surrender is the beginning of a stretch of demands aiming at a total restructuring of the conquered state. In this case, the aim of a just war comes close to being totalitarian. ‘[I]t is at this point that just wars come nearest to crusades.’ Crusaders do not aim at
defense or law enforcement, but at the creation of new political orders and at mass conversions (JUW, 113-4).

In his earlier writings, Walzer is clearly more prone to advocate such a rather minimalist post war involvement in the conquered state, than he is in his later writings:

[86] On the standard view, a just war (precisely because it is not a crusade) should end with the restoration of the status quo ante. The paradigm case is a war of aggression, which ends justly when the aggressor has been defeated, (...) the old boundaries restored. (AAW, 18.)

This minimalist option implies merely one proviso: that the threat posed by the aggressor state in the weeks or months before its attack should not be included in this ‘restoration’ (ibid. 92). At the most,

...[p]erhaps the peace treaty should include new security arrangements, of a sort that did not exist before the war, so that the status quo will be more stable in the future. But that is as far as the rights of the victims go; the theory as it was commonly understood did not extend to any radical reconstitution of the enemy state, and international law, with its assumptions about sovereignty, would have regarded any imposed change of regime as a new act of aggression. What happened after World War II in both Germany and Japan was something quite new in the history of war, and the legitimacy of occupation and political reconstitution is still debated, even by theorists and lawyers who regard the treatment of the Nazi regime, at least, as justified’ (JUW, 116).

Within this framework, one of the main questions is: will a government imposed by ‘foreign’ armies ever be accepted as a product of, and a future agent, of self-determination? Such seems to have been the case in Post-Nazi Germany, where the imposed government was democratic. Once such a government opens up the political arena and organizes elections, it may erase the memory of its own imposition. An unjust peace grows into being a just and lasting peace, but Walzer remains prima facie sceptical about attempts to restructure a conquered state.

**Humanitarian Intervention**

In the course of the decades, Walzer becomes increasingly aware of the complexity of establishing post war justice. ‘Humanitarian intervention radically shifts the argument about endings, because now the war is from the beginning an effort to change the regime that is responsible for the inhumanity’ (AAW, 19). Humanitarian intervention may be ‘much abused, no doubt, but (it is) morally necessary whenever cruelty and suffering are extreme and no local forces seem capable of putting an end to them’ (AAW, 69).
On the standard view of humanitarian intervention (which I adopted when writing *Just and Unjust Wars* almost twenty years ago), the source of the inhumanity is conceived as somehow external and singular in character: a tyrant, a conqueror or usurper, or an alien power set over against a mass of victims. (*AAW*, 70)

In such intervention cases, the aim is not to alter power relations on the ground, but merely only to ‘ameliorate their consequences – to bring food and medical supplies to populations besieged and bombarded, for example, without interfering with the siege or bombardment’ (*AAW*, 67). Soldiers are sent in small contingents and help out in cases ‘where it isn’t expected that they will have to fight’ (*AAW*, 67). But such interventions reflect an almost romantic view on the matter. Sometimes the evil that needs to be stopped is widely supported and is sustained by local structures and cultures. In that case,

... any potentially successful intervention is not going to meet the ‘in and out’ test. It is likely to require a much more sustained challenge to conventional sovereignty: a long-term military presence, social reconstruction, what used to be called ‘political trusteeship’ (since few of the locals – at least, the locals with power – can be trusted...) (*AAW*, 72)

Both in the case of the pushing back of an intruder, as was the case in the 1991 war against Iraq, as in the aftermath of a humanitarian intervention, such as in Kosovo, the powers who have initiated the just war are not in the luxury position to simply restore the pre-war situation. One may have come to the aid of a state, but ‘the victim state (...) is no more likely than the aggressor to be a bastion of sweetness and light’ (*AAW*, 93). The ambitions before the war may have been relatively minimalistic, such as stopping ethnic cleansing, but when the war is over, the invading powers must provide assistance and direction in establishing a more just regime. Although regime change is normally not a goal of a just war, it can sometimes be the consequence of a just war. Walzer is aware of this paradox:

Democratic political theory, which plays a relatively small part in our arguments about *jus ad bellum* and *in bello*, provides the central principles of (*jus post bellum*). They include self-determination, popular legitimacy, civil rights, and the idea of a common good. (*AAW*, 164)

The new government should be visibly committed to the welfare of all the people. Minorities should be protected against persecution, neighboring states protected against aggression, the poorest of the people protected against destitution and starvation.

Even so, Walzer argues that the US ambitions for a fully democratic and federalist Iraq are set too high. To be sure, some restructuring of Iraq is needed, but ‘postwar justice is probably best understood in a minima-
One example is trusteeship: acting in trust for the inhabitants, or protectorate, where the intervention brings some local group or coalition of groups to power and is then sustained only defensively (AAW, 76). (One may wonder whether Walzer’s insistence on the debarathification of Iraq meets this requirement of minimalism.) If an occupation is the only option left, another test for its justness is the direction it takes: ‘If its steady tendency is to empower the locals and if its benefits are widely distributed, the occupying country can plausibly be called just’ (AAW, 165-6). Walzer is critical of US ambitions in Iraq: the Bush administration has ‘brought to Iraq the crony capitalism that now prevails in Washington’ (AAW, 166). He also advocates a multilateral occupation, both for legitimacy and for efficiency (166-7).

Legitimacy and closure are the two criteria against which we can test war’s endings. Both of them are likely to require, in almost all the humanitarian intervention cases, something more than the restoration of the status quo ante. (...) Is it the price of doing well that you acquire responsibilities to do well again . . . and again? The work of the virtuous is never finished. (AAW, 21)

In short: minimalist ad bellum considerations may in effect lead to a much more extensive post bellum involvement in restructuring the conquered state. The tension between these two kinds of justice will never be resolved.

**Which Quo Ante**

As said, a war should, prima facie, be meant to restore the status quo ante. This is a genuinely conservative policy: if all wars were directed at restoring or respecting past situations, conquest wars, which have been so pivotal in human history (colonization!) would never have taken place. Thus: which ‘ante’ is meant? Most wars create new realities. Which of these consequences of a war should we accept and which not? And how long do we have to go back in history? An example: in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, one of the divisive themes is the return of refugees and their offspring to territories within the Green Line. Walzer argues that the claim to return effectively reopens the 1947-1948 conflict.

(This) is not a helpful thing to do more than half a century later. (The decision to keep Palestinians in refugee camps rather than resettling them) was a way of insisting that Israel’s independence war was not yet over. Today, (...) if the Palestinians are to win their own independence war, they must acknowledge that Israel’s is already won. (AAW, 121)

In practice, Walzer’s insistence on restoring pre-war conditions is thus ambiguous and is likely to yield justifications for opposed strategies.
Conclusions

With Michael Walzer towards a just peace? Ideally, a just peace presupposes that the war that preceded it was justified from the beginning and was fought justly in the restricted *in bello* sense of the word. But the relations between different spheres of justice are complex. First, just war theory uses relatively minimalistic conceptions of justice, such as pushing back an intruder and restoring a situation *quo ante*, whereas post war justice tends to, and sometimes must, aim at attaining a more fully developed kind of justice. But such an extension of post war justice will, in turn, influence the kind of considerations which count as good reasons to wage a war or an intervention. ‘The remedy I want to propose is to understand better the justice at which we cannot help aiming’ (*JUW*, 111). In the course of his own thinking, Walzer becomes increasingly open to include humanitarian considerations in *jus ad bellum*, so that the demands on a just peace grow accordingly.

The relationship between just war theory and a just peace is complex for other reasons, too. A war may have been just but may nevertheless precede an unjust peace. A country may have been right in waging a war and may have fought it justly, and still make a moral mess of the aftermath. Examples may be the establishing of a satellite regime, the taking of revenge against the citizens of the aggressor state, insistence on humiliating peace conditions, or the failure, after a humanitarian intervention, to help people rebuild their lives (*AAW*, 163). Reversely, unjust wars may yield a somewhat just peace, as Walzer hopes will be the case in Iraq. This overtly unjust war may result in a settlement, negotiated or enforced, that is fair to all, but Walzer stresses that such a settlement does not retrospectively justify the war: ‘We have to be able to argue about aftermaths as if this were a new argument. (...) The Iraq war is a case in point’ (*AAW*, 163). A country cannot simply walk out of an unjust war in the same way it came.

A just peace includes the roll-back of aggression with the option of demilitarisation the aggressor, it demands compensation to the victims (even though full compensation will never be possible) and trials of the aggressor, while at the same time preventing humiliating arrangements and rather aiming at political rehabilitation of the conquered state. Only in exceptional cases, unconditional surrender can be justified. A full surrender of the Japanese government should not have been demanded (it aimed at an unjust peace) and was used to justify the grossly unjust bombing of Japanese cities. The full surrender of the Nazis was a *sine qua non* for a just peace and did, even in hindsight, justify the indiscri-

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minate bombing in the early war years. Although regime change may be the result of the war, a war should normally not aim at such a change.

Almost anecdotically, the complex relationship between the several kinds of justice is illustrated by the ‘biography’ of a soldier. As a citizen in pre-war times, he or she is assumed to consent to high standard conceptions of justice, possibly even including supererogatory unilateral actions of peacemaking by his government. The outbreak of a war dramatically changes the odds. Wartime justice is minimalistic and includes a qualified right to kill, hurt, or damage. Once captured, a soldier has rights and obligations specified by a convention. Prisoners of war have a right to try to escape, which is a wartime right, but if they kill a guard in order to escape, the killing is not an act of war: it is murder, and thus a peacetime offense. Paradoxically, it is at the point of a gun that a soldier who surrenders, effectively gives up the ‘right to kill’ (JUW, 46-7). This is exactly how it should be: the extraordinary justice of war aims at restoring the much fuller kind of justice of peacetime. But does such a full kind of justice make the evils of war any more just?

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Summary

Michael Walzer stands out as one of the most important just war theorists of the past thirty years, if not the most important. His book *Just and Unjust Wars* (1977) updates just war theory so as to fit conditions of cold war thinking, techniques of modern warfare, and nuclear deterrence, so much different from times of the theory’s origins. In this and other works, Walzer also provides considerations about the nature of *post war justice* and about the way in which the rather different conceptions of justice before, in, and after a war are linked. But for all his merits for just war theory, Walzer has not provided a sufficiently systematic account of *jus post bellum*, and his account of just war does not provide sufficiently unambiguous guidelines for defining and establishing post war justice.